Abstract-A novel pricing and scheduling mechanism is proposed in this paper for plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) charging/discharging to track and synchronize with a renewable power generation pattern. Moreover, the proposed mechanism can be used in the demand-side management and ancillary service applications for the peak shaving and frequency regulation responding, respectively. We design a fully distributed stochastic optimization mechanism using a Bayesian pure strategic repeated game by which the PEVs optimally schedule their demands. We also use a mixed Bayesian-diffusion-Kalman filtering strategy for the customers to collaboratively estimate and track the stochastic price and regulation signals for the upcoming scheduling window. In this paper, all the characteristics of the PEVs as well as the uncertainty about their deriving patterns are considered. As our framework converges to an equilibrium even with incomplete information, it is agent-based, and the agents share the information only with their optional neighbors, it is scale free, robust, and secure.
I. INTRODUCTION
T ODAY, there is an extensive public attention all over the world for electrifying the transportation sector and integration of the renewable energy resources (RERs) into the power grid. In 2017, the sales of global plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) until September were over 764 000 units (46% higher than that in the same period of 2016) [1] . However, increasing the penetration of the RERs and PEVs into the traditional power systems is a critical and can put the reliability and stability of the power grid into danger and degrade its performance and efficiency. This is due to high intermittent nature of the RERs, their inconsistency with energy usage, and high/uncertain power demand of the PEVs. So, it is essential to provide an effective energy management framework to schedule and control the time/amount of charge and discharge of the PEVs and match them with the renewable time/amount of power generation.
A. Related Work
Integration of the PEVs into a power system with high wind power penetrations and the application of considering the PEVs as a regulation services provider have been addressed in [2] . The western Danish power system where the total share of annual wind power production is more than 27% of the electrical energy demand was chosen for study in this analysis. Jin et al. in [3] formulated the energy consumption scheduling (ECS) problem as a stochastic optimization problem based on a queuing model that uses Lyapunov dynamic optimization technique to minimize the time average cost of using nonrenewable energy sources. Zhang et al. [4] considered a delay-optimal ECS of the PEVs with queue mapping to convert the PEV queue to the charge demand queue at a charging station equipped with renewable energy generation devices and multiple charge points. Furthermore, an independent Markov decision process (MDP) has been described in this investigation to take into account uncertainty of the PEV arrival, the intermittence of the RERs, and the variation of the grid power price.
Chen and Duan [5] proposed a method for optimal integration of the PEVs in the microgrids dealing with uncertainties associated with the daily distance driven of the PEVs, load values, and electricity market price and considered an optimal number of parking numbers under optimal scheduling of the PEVs. The problem of matching the stochastic wind power with the PEVs charging schedule considering the optimality of the expected charging cost has been studied by Huang et al. [6] . This stochastic multistage matching problem has been formulated as an MDP by aggregating the PEVs according to their remaining parking time and was solved by a simulation-based policy improvement method. A real-time load elasticity tracking and pricing for the ECS problem by predicting the PEV charging behavior of the consumers at different prices have been investigated by Soltani et al. [7] . The dependencies on price responsiveness among consumers are captured by a conditional random field model in this paper. Lee et al. [8] perused the price competition among the PEV charging stations equipped with renewable power generators where each station sets its electricity price to maximize its revenue by competing with its neighbors. The proposed model in this paper is a game-theoretic model in which some relevant physical constraints, such as the transmission line capacity, the distance between the PEV and charging station, and the number of charging outlets at the charging station, are taken into account.
A two-layer hierarchical control scheme for the coordination of PEVs and wind turbines in a microgrid has been modeled in [9] . The main feature of this scheme is that it incorporates the non-Gaussian uncertainty and partial dispatchability of wind power as well as the PEV uncertainty. A two-stage (day-ahead/real-time) mechanism was established in [10] for integrating the massive PEVs into the power grid, tackling the RESs' uncertainties and coordinating them to reduce the energy cost and peak-to-average ratio of the system. At the first stage, based on the prediction of future energy requests and considering the elastic charging property of the PEVs, an offline day-ahead optimal energy generation scheduling problem was formulated to determine the energy generation. Then at the second stage, based on the planned energy generation, an adaptive real-time charging strategy is developed to determine the charging rate of each vehicle in a dynamic manner. A charging rate compression algorithm, which tremendously reduces the complexity of the problem solving, has been also developed in this paper. In [11] , the ECS problem has been formulated using MDP and solved using a distributed simulation-based policy improvement. The proposed method takes into account the uncertain wind power sources and can be improved from heuristicand experience-based policies. A case study in Beijing (China) was developed to explore the potential of wind power of highrise buildings in supporting the PEVs charging. Yang et at. [12] considered a grid-connected microgrid model that consists of a logistics distribution system, where the PEVs depart from the depot, deliver the goods to multiple demand loads, and then return to the depot.
A coordinated dispatch strategy of the PEVs to smooth renewable energy and load fluctuations of the microgrid has been developed while ensuring the quality of logistics services. They established an ECS method using a self-adaptive imperialist competitive algorithm to optimize the driving routes, fast-charging time, and regular-charging/discharging strategies of multiple PEVs. Luo et al. [13] studied the problem of stochastic dynamic pricing and energy management policy for the PEV charging service providers in the presence of the energy storage system and multiple uncertainty sources. They offered guidelines for charging service providers to the determine proper charging prices and manage the electricity to balance the competing objectives of improving profitability, enhancing customer satisfaction, and reducing impact on power grid in spite of these uncertainties. Moreover, a new metric to assess the impact on power grid, without completely solving the power flow equations, has been proposed in this paper.
B. Our Contributions
Based on the drawbacks in previous works, we are motivated to contribute to the following. 1) Designing a robust and scalable game mechanism: The availability of some forms of information to all the customers and to the utility company is fundamental to coordinate their actions to result in a socially fair solution. However, this raises some challenges such as requiring a two-way data communication network with high communication/computation capability, preserving the customers' privacy, and ensuring the power grid security and reliability. As in our framework the customers communicate and share information only with their optional neighbors and the proposed Bayesian game converges to an equilibrium even with incomplete information, the mechanism is scale free, requires low communication/computation, and is more secure and reliable. Furthermore, as long as the topology and information sharing rule of the communication network satisfy some conditions, as described in Section IV of this paper, the power grid is robust to noise, link failures, and incomplete information.
2) Providing a universal real-time ECS:
As there are several uncertainty sources (market price, power generation, power consumption, etc.) in the power grid, the timeahead ECS methods usually lead to suboptimal or even nonoptimal solutions. So, we develop a real-time mechanism using the rolling horizon technique and online adaptive Bayesian-diffusion strategy to optimize the solution. The proposed method is universal in the sense that it can be used for both demand-side management (DSM) and ancillary service necessities. 3) Considering the customer's attribution: The works in the literature are mostly focusing on using the flexibility of the battery of the PEVs for DSM and frequency regulation objectives without explicitly addressing the PEV's energy demand limitation at the end of each scheduling window.
We proceed in this matter by formulating a pure strategic game and involving the characteristics of PEVs in detail. We develop a binary Markov chain model updated using the Bayesian method to predict the PEVs plug-in and departure times. Moreover, we provide a robust model by which the total energy demand of each PEV for its next trip is estimated. 4) Mitigating the adverse effect of the PEV and RER: By designing a novel real-time behavioral price policy, the customers in the considered model try to match their PEVs' charging/discharging pattern with the stochastic highly fluctuating power generated from the RERs by tracking its variation. This results in making the balance between supply and demand sides and jointly smoothing out the total power generation and consumption curves. The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. We demonstrate the system model in Section II. Section III introduces the agent-based game-theoretic PEV scheduling problem. The Bayesian-diffusion-Kalman filtering solution is developed in Section IV. The simulation results are presented and assessed in Section V, and Section VI provides the concluding remarks.
Notation: Lower-(upper-) case boldface letters denote column vectors (matrices), and calligraphic letters stand for sets. The notation E[·] denotes expectation operator, | · | denotes the cardinality operation of a set, Tr(·) denotes the matrix trace operation, Pr(·) denotes the probability operation, × N n =1 denotes the Cartesian product over N elements, ⊗ N n =1 denotes the σ-algebra [14] product on the Cartesian product, andã implies that a is a random variable. We denote the σ-algebra of Borel [15] subsets of a by B(a) and its transpose by a T . Furthermore,
(A 2 /A 1 ) and N n /j is the set of player n's neighbors including itself and excluding neighbor j. The subscript a t stands for value of variable a for a period t, whereas to denote its value at a time slot h within period t we use a h instead of a h,t for simplicity.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a smart microgrid system (network) comprising of one utility company that procures energy from the wholesale market and its own renewable farm and serves a set N {1, . . . , N} of N = |N | PEVs of residential/commercial/industrial owners (called the customers) as shown in Fig. 1 . Each customer's site is equipped with an energy consumption manager (ECM) device responsible for scheduling of its PEV power consumption, i.e., determining the optimal PEV charging/discharging rate/time. The customers participate in the ECS program for a long time divided into set T {1, . . . , T } of equal length periods, while their actions have a periodic pattern within each t ∈ T (e.g., one year with |T | = T = 365 and each period t ∈ T as one day). We divide each period t ∈ T into a set Fig. 1 . As is depicted, the PEV is in off mode when is unplugged (out of scheduling window H t n ) or when it has finished its work, and does not consume more power.
A. PEV Characterization
Let us denote PEV n operation mode in time slot h ∈ H t n with binary decision variables x h n,c ∈ {0 (asleep), +1 (awakecharge)} and x h n,d ∈ {0 (asleep), −1 (awake-discharge)}. In an optimal scheduling of the PEV n's operation at each t, the ECM faces the following constraints:
where
n , and B cap n are the energy level at the end of slot h, initial energy level, minimum acceptable energy level, and the battery capacity, respectively. Coefficients η n,c , η n,d ∈ (0, 1] denote charging and discharging efficiency, and x rat n is the rated power at which the PEV is charged/discharged. The first dynamic term of (1) is for providing the required energy level for the next trip before the departure time of the PEV. The second line denotes the evolution of the energy level of the battery of the PEV. The constraints in the third line bound the energy level and denote the tolerable deviation from E d,t n , respectively. The fourth line of (1) implies that the PEV cannot be charged and discharged at the same time, and the fifth line 
T . Accordingly, the ECM updates its feasible set X h n := {x h n | constraints in (1)} at each h ∈ H t and resets them at each new t ∈ T .
B. Energy Source Model
We assume that the renewable power is produced by a wind farm comprising of a set
where 
where, mostly, the wind speed is considered to have Weibull distribution with ω h k = 2, which is specifically known as the Rayleigh distribution. Moreover, the higher the c h k , the greater the number of days/hours that have high winds (see [18] for details). The utility company needs to know the total power drawn from the renewable farm k ∈KP h k,r and the aggregate non-PEV load demand n ∈N l h n for each time slot h ∈ H t before the scheduling window. Accordingly, the utility company makes a contract with the wholesale market for buying the total base power P h b required for making the balance between the supply and demand sides. However, there is always inaccuracy in determining P h b ahead of time, which must be compensated in real time by some regulation powerw h . The required regulation powerw h to make the real-time balance is calculated as follows:w
It is rational to assume that the utility company determines P h b properly at each slot so thatw h follows a normal distribution
C. Price Design
In the utility company view, the most suitable tool to encourage the customers for following a specific energy consumption pattern is establishing an effective price policy. As in the pricing policy the customers' payment depends on the time and amount of consumed energy, the customers try to consume more energy at low-price times and vice versa. So, it is rational to assume that the utility company determines its price parameter at slot h ∈ H t in period t based oñ
where random variablep 
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Sources of Uncertainty
The deriving patterns of the PEVs are stochastic in nature. So, to provide an efficient charging/discharging schedule at each period t, the plug-in time (i.e., α t n ), the plug-out time (i.e., β t n ), and the total energy demand (i.e., E d,t n ) of each PEV n during the connection time H t n need to be estimated accurately. To estimate the stochastic parameters α t n and β t n , one can model the available time (i.e., the length of H t n ) of PEV n as a binary Markov chain with state = 1 denoting that the PEV is available to the ECM (e.g., is in the parking lot) and state = 0 denoting that the PEV is unavailable. Staring from an initial state, we can infer the feasible scheduling window H t n using the transition probabilities of the corresponding Markov chain.
Let us denote the status of PEV n within the period t by the homogenous and stationary Markov chain M 3 The PDF ofw h is assumed to be Gaussian N (m, σ 2 r ) when the PEV penetration to the power grid is large enough to support some base loads as well as tracking the wind power production.
observed sequence is then [20] 
where h ij is the number of one-step transition from state i to state j until time slot h and the unknown probability parameter ζ t n = (ρ n,01 , ρ n,10 ) ∈ [0, 1] can be inferred using a proper estimation technique, such as the maximum likelihood estimates. However, as we aim to provide a real-time adaptive PEV charging strategy, Bayesian inference, which incorporates a certain type of dependence between the components of the parameters in different periods t ∈ T , seems to be the most suitable choice. Proposition 1: Considering Jeffreys' prior distribution π(ζ t n ) on parameters ρ n,01 and ρ n,10 , the conditional posterior density becomes [22] .
To infer E d,t n , we propose to use a deterministic set to model the uncertainty, which results in a robust decision about the desired energy demand at each period t. Inspired by the work in [23] , we consider the following uncertainty set of the desired energy demand at each time period t in the planning horizon T :
where N n is the set of PEVs managed by the ECM of customer n with cardinality |N n | = N n and E
n | are the true vector, the estimated vector, and the deviation vector of the uncertain energy demands for the PEVs under control of customer n, respectively. Furthermore, the parameter Δ t n is the budget of uncertainty (confidence level parameter), taking values between 0 and N n , and is determined by the customer according to its attribution. As Δ t n increases from 0 to N n , the size of the uncertainty set enlarges, and the resulting robust decision is more conservative and the system is protected against a higher degree of uncertainty.
B. Optimization Problem
Assuming the grid's customers are selfish, their participation in any ECS program is to minimize their payments. In this way, the social objective function of the customers is defined as follows:
n ∈ E t n , and t ∈ T (10) where
T is the operation matrix of PEV n throughout the scheduling window H t . Furthermore, X h n is the feasible set updated at slot h in period t that comprises the set of profiles satisfying constraints in (1) . Centrally solving problem (10) imposes a very high communication/computation burden on the central controller, puts into danger the privacy of the customer as their information must be sent to the central controller, and is not reliable as any failure in the central controller would take down the whole system. Although the semidecentralized solutions (such as the classical Nash game method) can alleviate some drawbacks of the centralized solutions, they still need each customer to send some parts of its information to all other customers. So, these methods are not fully scalable, reliable, or secure. Due to the drawbacks of centralized and semidecentralized solutions, problem (10) must be solved in a fully distributed manner with only local cooperation and partially available information. However, this problem is stochastic and spatially temporally coupled [due to the price parametersp h and constraints in (1)], which complicates providing an optimal distributed solution. To solve this problem, we suggest developing a stochastic Bayesian game with private and incomplete information mechanism defined as G = X 
−n are the set of action and type spaces of all the players except for player n with strategy X h −n at slot h of period t, respectively. This payoff function is dual in negative direction of problem (10) comminuted corresponding to PEV n throughout one scheduling window as
5) Information structure π t : It is a probability distribution measure on the measurable space
h∈H t denoting the common prior over type profiles, with π t n the marginal probability measure induced by π t on S h n , i.e., the probability measure on In deploying the proposed game in real time, each player in the Bayesian game adopts a behavioral or mixed infinite strategy according to its prior π t n (S h n ). The existence proof of a BayesNash equilibrium in this situation is straightforward (e.g., see [25] and [26] for detailed analysis and examples). However, satisfying the temporally coupled energy demand constraint [i.e., the first term of (1)] and determining an optimal schedule need developing a pure strategic game. So, we must convert the behavioral/mixed strategy into a pure strategy for each subscheduling window H τ n using some purification technique. 4 In the proposed game G , at each slot, the customers update their beliefs according to Bayes theory (14) . So, the best choice for the purification is matching the rolling horizon theory [28] with updating procedure to ensure that, at any individual condition and preference, the constraints in (1) are not violated and the solution is optimal.
Theorem 1: The behavioral/mixed strategy of game G has an equivalent pure strategy, and there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) for considered game G caused by applying the rolling horizon technique on set of pure strategies
where X * h n and X * h −n denote the equilibrium strategies of player n and all other players decided at slot h for the rest of the slots
In the next section, we provide a fully distributed Bayesian mechanism for each customer n to learn his type S n (s 
IV. BAYESIAN REAL-TIME SOLUTION
To construct a pure strategy for each customer n ∈ N , we need to provide an agent-based method by which each customer can sequentially estimate the baseline price signal vectorp n,sh are his expected payments at the end of the scheduling window determined at slot h based on the most recent information about the baseline price, shadow prices, and other explanatory variables. We model any explanatory data (weather condition, fossil fuel price, price in previous days, etc.) available to customer n at slot h by z h n . Accordingly, customer n's parameter estimation problem within each period t ∈ T at slot h takes the following form:
where O is a compact set that captures possible prior information of slot h − 1. Local function measure F n (·) of customer n is a convex function ofΘ h . A popular optimal choice for F n (·), often advocated in Bayesian theory, is the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) measure. This function is defined as follows:
where determining densityπ 
Common model to describe f 
where δ ≡ δ(Θ) is the natural parameter, T (y, z) is a sufficient statistic of a fixed size, h(y, z) is a known function, and g(Θ) is a known normalizing function. Furthermore, ξ is a hyperparameter of the same size as T (y, z), ν ∈ R + is a scalar hyperparameter, and q(ξ, ν) is a known function. Taking advantage of this distribution under conjugacy, the Bayesian update 
For sharing the information in a neighborhood N n , we use a powerful and robust technique called diffusion strategy [31] . One interesting estimation scenario by the diffusion strategy runs by first exchanging the measurements between the customers during an adaptation phase and, after that, exchanging the estimates during a combination phase called adapt-thencombine. The aim of the adaptation phase is to enrich the statistical knowledge of each customer by incorporation of the neighbors' observations. Let us fix other customers' actions and consider customer n turn with its prior density π represents all the information available to customer n by time h − 1, which includes its own past observations and those of its neighbors as well as the parameters of all previous posteriors of the neighbors. Accordingly, the adaptation phase of the diffusion update takes the form (18) Consequently, the purpose of the combination phase is to collaboratively improve the estimates of the customers with some proper combination protocols. As we use the KLD function and the customers try to minimize the cumulative loss
, the combination step to achieve a nonnegative minimal KLD takes the form [30] 
where coefficients {c nm ,i , ∀m ∈ N n } are unit |N n |-simplex weights expressing the degree of belief of customer n in customer {m ∈ N n }'s information. So, we can formulate the combination phase aŝ 
To compute the combination weights, if we arrange the weights into vector c h n , it has a categorical distribution parameterized by a probability vector q h n with the probability mass function and expected values as [30] 
However, customer n does not know which neighbor has the best knowledge aboutΘ t . So, the customer measures how well neighbor m fits the observations using the predictive performance as follows: (23) [32] . Inspired by the diffusionKalman filtering concept [33] , one can model the variation of the unknown parameterΘ t and the customer n's observation as the following state space model:
where A t n , B t n , and H t n are matrices of compatible dimensions, and both h and υ h are independent and identically distributed Gaussian noises. Let us modify this method under the BayesianKalman filtering approach as follows [34] :
where Q h n and R h n are state and observation covariance matrices of customer n. At customer n's side, we denote mean and covariance matrices of the Gaussian prior probability density function π . The properties of normal distribution ensure that the predicted prior probability density function π t n (Θ h |y
Subsequently, Bayes' theorem suggests updating the prior of 
where from (26) we can write the observation model as
with compilable form of conjugate normal distribution as
So, we can replace Bayesian update (28) by updating the hyperparameters (16) as
Now, applying the adaptation phase (18) leads to [34] 
and the classical Kalman filter update equations are drown using the least-squares estimator, exploiting the blocks of the matrix ξ h n in (29) and applying the adaptation phase [similar to (34) ] on this matrix [30] , [34] 
Applying the combination phase (20) to the above equation results in the desired parameterŝ
where meanΘ h n and covarianceΣ h n are used to estimateΘ h . Finally, we present our Bayesian-diffusion-Kalman filtering ECS mechanism (BdiffKF-ECS) in Algorithm 1, which is executed by each PEV n. Theorem 2: The proposed mechanism in Algorithm 1 converges to a unique PSNE with a finite number of iterations if the power grid topology satisfies the following conditions. 
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e., the new schedule changes compared to the current schedule), Then set X h n,i+1 as the new solution and broadcast it to the neighbors.
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Until convergence (i.e., none of the customers broadcast their schedules) 16:
Customer n applies element x h n of X h n and discards the others according to the rolling horizon [37] .
Condition P: For each player n ∈ N , each neighbor j ∈ N n , and any strategies
Condition N: For each player n ∈ N and for any neighbors j, i ∈ N n such that j = i, there exists ∈ N j /i Δ N i /j, such that there is a path from to n that passes neither through j nor through i.
Proof: See Appendix B. Condition P implies that the action of a player always affects his neighbors' payoffs, so its behavior is learnable (deviation is detectable). A three-connected 5 network in which players have different neighbors, i.e., for any pair (j, i) ∈ N 2 , N j /i = N i /j, satisfies Condition N (see [35] for a detailed information and proof about Conditions P and N). To guarantee the power grid topology satisfies Condition N, one can let the customers decide their neighbors. Then, the utility company checks if the graph is connected (has the Laplacian matrix with positive second smallest eigenvalue [36] ) and each customer has at least three customers (the degree of the graph is at least three). Otherwise, with some manipulation, the utility company can fix the system topology.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Simulation Setup
For the simulation scenario, it is assumed that there is one utility company procuring electricity from both conventional and renewable resources and serving 50-2000 customers of different types (e.g., residential, commercial, educational, organizational, and industrial). Each day t ∈ T is divided into H t = 96 slots each with a duration of 15 min. The baseline day-ahead electricity price data are drawn randomly from Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection electricity market [38] . It is assumed that each customer has one PEV with charge/discharge power rate 2 ≤ x Customers that are within a certain radius (e.g., within radius = 0.5 km) from each other are declared neighbors and connected to each other. To guarantee this, we repeat generating random topologies with increasing search radius until the degree of each vertex in the acquired topology is no less than three and the second smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix is positive. The combination weights c h nm are initialized according to the Metropolis rule introduced in [39] , and then replaced by weights ϑ h nm updated according to (24) at each slot h. The simulations are done in a PC Laptop 64-bit Intel Core i7-4510U CPU @ 2.00-2.60 GHz RAM 8.00 GB with MATLAB R2017b and its CVX toolbox working with Gurobi.
B. Performance Results
The performance of the estimation part in Algorithm 1 is shown in Fig. 2 . As a measure of estimation performance between noncooperative mode (in which there is not any information sharing) and diffusion mode (in which the customers cooperate and share information with each other), Fig. 2(a) shows the average mean square deviation (MSD) from the true value. Clearly, in the noncooperative case, the estimation performance is much worse and more unreliable. The learning and tracking abilities of the proposed method are demonstrated in Fig. 2(b) and (c) for estimating the baseline and regulation signals, respectively. As an insight, we can see that after a few iterations, the estimated values match the true value with acceptable accuracy. The convergence of the proposed method in solving problem (10) is analyzed in Fig. 3 . As shown by the results in Fig. 3(a) and (b), only one iteration per customer (total of 50 iterations per 50 customers) suffices for convergence. So, we can consider the proposed mechanism as a one-shot infinitely repeated Bayesian game. Furthermore, both panels of Fig. 3 show that the customers' payment depends on the parameters γ h in (6). So, the utility company can change the customers' consumption pattern as his wish by properly tuning γ h . For better presenting the impact of γ h on the customers' behavior, Fig. 4 (a) and (b) is provided. In Fig. 4(a) , the parameters of the system are demonstrated. The behavior of aggregated charge/discharge of the PEVs is presented in Fig. 4(b) . As depicted, when the shadow price is much higher than the baseline price, the customers attempt to track the regulation signal as much as possible to reduce the total payment. However, while γ h reduces, the impact of the baseline price on the total payment is increased. So, the customers try to charge their PEVs in slots with low baseline prices and discharge them at slots with high prices.
The applications of the proposed framework in terms of the two important aspects of power systems, namely, ancillary service and load curve shaping (e.g., valley filling and pick clipping), are analyzed and the results are presented in Fig. 5(a) and (b). Fig. 5(a) shows the ancillary service result in which the total consumption of the PEVs tracks the regulation signal to mitigate the destructive effects of power fluctuations of the renewable resources. The result of the proposed mechanism in Algorithm 1 under the DSM protocol is depicted in Fig. 5(b) . We can see that the PEVs are in charge mode (to fill the valley) at slots with low demand and in discharge mode (to curtail the peak) at the slots with high (peak) demand. However, as shown, the discharge time of the PEVs is not effectively coincided with the true peak, because the baseline price is not appropriately determined by the utility company. This shows the importance of adjusting the baseline price signal to having the highest value in the highest demand time. As we formulated our problem as an infinitely repeated Bayesian game, it is necessary to evaluate its long-term performance. The signal tracking ability of Algorithm 1 is denoted in Fig. 6 . Clearly, the performance of the algorithm in tracking the frequency regulation signal coming from the utility company is acceptable. We must note that none of the customer's constraints in (1) is violated in this result and all the PEVs have n at the end of each day. In another scenario, the long-term performance of the DSM application is analyzed over 30 days. The results are presented in Fig. 7 , which shows that the proposed repeated game works well and fills/curtails the aggregate demand valleys/peaks.
In modeling the interactions between the customers, the game-theoretic methods turns out to be the state-of-the-art dominant strategy in the DSM and PEV charge/discharge scheduling literature [7] , [8] , [13] , [40] , [41] . To guarantee the convergence of these methods to an equilibrium (e.g., Nash equilibrium), it is essential for each customers to know the consumption pattern of all other customers in the system (either directly or through a third party entity). Furthermore, to achieve a global optimal solution, it is necessary for the system to determine a proper price signal and broadcast it to the customers step by step. In our real-time scheduling program, with growing the system, this procedure would impose high communication and computational burden to the system, as shown in Fig. 8(a) . From this results, we can find out that for a wide system with 2000 customers, it took about 41 min for the game-theoretic mechanism with a centralized price determining mechanism [Nash game (centralized)] to converge to an optimal solution, which is not acceptable. Estimating the price signal with our diffusion framework would reduce the computation/communication time of the game-theoretic mechanism [Nash game (diffusion)] to almost 33, which is still a long time for the real-time application. However, Fig. 8(a) shows that our BdiffKF-ECS mechanism has very low computation/communication time, especially for the BdiffKF-ECS (diffusion) scenario that takes 8 min.
The most important thing is that even with such a low computation/communication between the customer, the optimal solution of the proposed framework is almost the same as that of the Nash games. The results in Fig. 8 (b) assert our claim. From this figure, we can see that the centralized solution achieves the minimum aggregate cost. However, the centralized solutions impose a huge computational burden to such a system and is not applicable in real world. Besides, as in centralized solutions all the data are gathered in the central controller, the privacy of the customers is always in danger. Another drawback of the centralized solutions is that any lack of proper operation in the central control (either deliberately because of the cyber attacks or unintentionally because of communication failures and inaccuracies) has high destructive effect on the system efficiency.
In the stochastic problems with too many stochastic parameters like ours, these drawbacks put down the viability of the solution mechanism, as shown in Fig. 9(a) . As we can see in this figure, inaccuracy (noise) in determining the stochastic parametersp h and E d,t n as well as random link failure between some of the customers makes the "Nash game (centralized)" mechanism unstable and nonoptimal. However, when the price signalp h is estimated through our Bayesian-diffusion framework "Nash game (diffusion)," the mechanism becomes more stable and the aggregate cost reduces. The most effective case is when both the scheduling part and price estimation part are implemented according to our mechanism "BdiffKF-ECS (diffusion)." In this case, the proposed mechanism is robust to link failure and noise (as the communications between the customers are done locally) and works well in the presence of the uncertainty resources (thanks to our real-time adaptive stochastic mechanism).
The DSM performance comparison results of the proposed framework under uncertainty are presented in Fig. 9(b) . Considering the uncertain nature of customers deriving pattern (i.e., parameters α t n , β t n , and E d,t n ) results in a lower peak demand [case "load curve (our mechanism)"] and better utilization of the potential flexibility of the PEVs [case "PEV (our mechanism)"]. In the case "PEV (no learning)," in which the classical game is implemented instead of the Bayesian repeated game, the high charging(discharging) power is not properly coincided with the low(high) price value. This can increase the customers payment and the total system peak demand compared to our mechanism.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a universal real-time distributed DSM-ancillary service framework applied to the PEVs using the Bayesian repeated game, the diffusion strategy, and the Kalman filtering theory. We characterized the PEVs specification and provided a pure strategic game using the rolling horizon theory to achieve an optimal solution and to fully take the customers' attribution into account. Furthermore, we formulated a novel real-time pricing policy by which the utility company can control and modify the consumption pattern of the PEVs to mitigate the adverse effect of fluctuation of the RERs and charge of the PEVs. The simulation results demonstrated that by appropriately determining the price and regulation signals, the utility company can increase the reliability of the power system by making the balance between the generated and consumed power. 6 If there is a real-valued integrable function φ n on S h n , C h n , and π t n , such that |U t n (a, x n )| ≤ φ t n (x n ) for all (a, x n ) ∈ X h × S h n , then U t n is integrably bounded.
2) The private information S h n of each player n ∈ N in the proposed game model is independent 7 of all other players' private information. 3) For each customer n ∈ N , S h n is atomless 8 (1)- (3) provide the necessary and sufficient conditions (i.e., they guarantee a saturated probability space for each customer 10 ) for the existence of a PSNE in our model (see [42, Th. 1] for proof).
Using the backward induction, the rolling horizon theory implies that the problem at hand at each slot h has an equivalent pure strategy and subsequentially a PSNE [28] .
B. Proof of Theorem 2
The proposed mechanism in Algorithm 1 comprises infinite subgames repeated at each slot h ∈ H of each period t ∈ T . The convergence analysis must be done using backward induction denoting that each subgame in h ∈ H t ⊂ T results in a subgame perfect equilibrium. However, we analyze one subgame and the extension to the infinitely repeated game is straightforward using backward induction [44] . The algorithm convergence comprises the following three aspects.
1) Convergence of the Bayesian-diffusion estimation procedure:
In [45] , it has been proved that by adopting appropriate adaptation and combination weights, the diffusion estimation process converges with good accuracy and the benefit of this cooperation is examined in detail in [46] . Similarly, the convergence of the Bayesian version of diffusion strategy has been proved in [30] . By adopting proper outlier analysis for choosing a h nm according to the work in [47] , and proper approach for choosing a h nm , such as the quasi-Bayesian [32] or adaptive combination weights [48] , the convergence of the estimation stage is guaranteed. 2) Convergence of the optimization procedure: At each iteration i, customer n solves the optimization problem (11) . We solved this problem using mixed-integer disciplined convex programming methods, such as branch and bound and sequential quadratic programming, for which the convergence to a unique optimal/suboptimal solution has been proved [49] . 3) Convergence of the game-theoretic framework: The payoff function in (11) is strictly monotone with respect to
